Privatization of Japan’s railroad
After the war, the National Railways, which was regarded as the backbone of the domestic transportation system and positioned as a public enterprise entity, required independent deliberations on fare revision and facility investment despite being an independent profit system separate from the national finance It was a system of inconvenience.
This system worked smoothly during the postwar reconstruction period. In other words, the necessity and order of capital investment for reconstruction are clear, and the fares kept low are fully covered by the growing demand. However, since the end of postwar rebuilding, the financial strength of the national railroad began to deteriorate. First of all, in 1964 when the Tokaido Shinkansen opened, the balance of the national railway which had been in the surplus until then accounted for a deficit as a single year. After that, the deficit continued, and in 1967 it fell into a deficit that carried over the surplus accumulated and carried forward. JNR aimed for fiscal rebuilding and formulated the first reconstruction plan in 1969 but the expansion of the deficit did not stop and in 1971 it exceeded the income amount only by the expenditure necessary for normal corporate activities and “repayment of debt I got into a situation I can not do (deficit before amortization) “.
From 1971 to 1972, at the site of the JNR, a productivity improvement campaign to improve the deficit (commonly known as the Maru Bike Movement) was held. Although this is a campaigning private enterprise that is inevitable in the management crisis, it is obviously an improvement campaign to be implemented, but from the beginning of the management side’s management it is pointed out as “unfair labor practice” to the massacre, resulting in no productivity improvement effect It ended in. This problem continued to remain as a large lump between labor and management for a long time afterwards. Although various countermeasures were examined after that, it was far from solving, the deficit of the national railway continued to increase. As a radical countermeasure, the privatization plan of the National Railway Company was considered from about 1980, and in 1987 the JNR was divided and privatized.
Efforts to rebuild the national railway
If the business situation of the JNR was a general company, it was worth the bankruptcy in 1971 when it became a deficit before amortization. However, the government and the National Railways Authority did not go over to destroy the national railway, which is the foundation of domestic transportation, and implemented various remedies.
Regarding the deficit local line that became a problem since the 1960s, I regretted that the JNR Advisory Committee selected the deficit 83 lines in 1968 and regretted that it had been torn down, and the Japan National Owners’ Railway Business Reconstruction Promotion Special Measures Law enacted in 1980 (National Railways Based on the reconstruction law), we specified 3157.2 km of the 83-line area as a specific local transportation line, and we switched to the 3rd sector railroad by 1990. Meanwhile, in 1976 and 1981, about 5 trillion yen of debt was put on shelves. In 1976, the average fare raise was raised by 50%, and even after that, frequent price increases were made to increase sales, but the deficit continued to increase as the users left away.
At that time, the national railroads were unlikely to have unions such as the National Railway Labor Union (Kokugetsu) and the National Railway Power Trainers’ Union (Mobility), without regard for the inconvenience of the customers, to political He was repeating his activities. In the forward struggle, buyers responded, and in 1973 passengers’ anger was exploded and the Ageo Incident occurred, and further investment in the National Railways and fare increase were not accepted It was.
The reconstruction of the national railway was regarded as an important item in the activities of the Second Extraordinary Administrative Study Committee, which began in 1981. As a fundamental measure, a privatization plan emerged to establish independent independence of railway management and eliminate the influence of politicians.
The report issued in 1983 was declared privatization of the National Railways, the “JNR reconstruction management committee” was established in the same year, consideration was made for the divisional privatization, and in 1985 rationalization of 100,000 people etc. A final report including it was issued. Meanwhile, the National Railways Authority also made significant rationalizations through self-help efforts, making it possible to reduce staff.
The sense of crisis that the workplace is unlikely to be unionized also gradually improves the relationship between the management side and the movement, while on the other hand the domestic work which continued taking the opposite stance dropped to a minority partner. In 1987 division privatization was implemented.
Split and privatize the JNR
As measures to deal with the bankruptcy of the JNR, on November 28, 1986, eight bills related to the reform of the national railroads were established. According to this law the National Railway was divided privatized on 1 April 1987.
the purpose
Elimination of massive debt and elimination of political intervention
Due to the progress of motorization, the railway railway in rural areas and the rise in labor costs due to the aging of staff members who made the national railway hire a large amount of national railway as employment countermeasures of the war repatrior (the wages system of the national railway depends on the number of years of service ), The Japanese state-owned railroad, which had been in the black until then, fell into the deficit from 1964 (Showa 39) when the Tokaido Shinkansen opened. In the latter half of the 1960s, due to the failure of the “Maru Bike Movement” which is a productivity improvement movement, labor-management relations worsened and a strait law struggle and a strike right strike occurred.
JNR, which was separated from the Ministry of Railways and was established as a public corporation entity of independent revenue system in 1949 (1949), politicians no longer be held accountable for the balance of national railway balance, but fare, budget, new line construction, personnel affairs Regarding “important decisions” that can be said as the foundation of management, we received strong political intervention because the approval of the National Assembly was necessary.
For example, for the purpose of preventing election measures and prevention of inflation, the government was not allowed to enter other industries other than the transportation industry, because the government suspended price increases of fares and pressured private sector. Also, in order to induce profits to obtain a vote in return for attracting railroads to the electoral districts of politicians, said Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei ‘s remodeling of the Japanese archipelago or “Irajimaetsu”, the construction request of the regional local line Strongly, construction of the deficit local line which can not be profitable continued until the new construction was frozen in 1980 (Showa 55).
Since the establishment of the Nippon Railway Construction Public Corporation, the government was responsible for the construction cost of such local lines, but the deficit after the start of business was a burden of the National Railways. In the metropolitan area (especially in the metropolitan area), the railroad commuting situation has become extremely worse due to the rapid population concentration, and at the national railway which was required to take measures, the transportation power is enhanced by developing “five commuter commutation strategies” However, there was almost no subsidy from the country, which was the burden of the national railway to the expenses required for this. A huge amount of expenses were also invested in the construction of the Shinkansen, and the construction cost was accumulated as the debt of the JNR as it was. The Ministry of Transportation (present · Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport) also opposed privatization.
Although the subsidy was issued by the government, it was in the state of “water to the rocks”, and since the Showa 50’s, the fare was raised by 50% to regain the restraint of the fare so far, and the fare was raised every year after that , Which caused the users to leave rather than lines in the metropolitan area or even the Shinkansen, which resulted in a decrease in users, which did not lead to an improvement in income balance.
In 1980, the government established the Japan National Railway Business Reconstruction Promotion Special Measures Law (National Railways Rebuilding Act), which was reputed to be the “last autonomous reconstruction plan”, to reduce personnel and to construct new local railway lines Such as division of routes based on freezing and transport density (trunk line / regional transportation line / specified local transportation line) and measures based on it (separation of specific local transportation lines from the National Railways, conversion of buses, introduction of extra fare to local transportation lines) We incorporated measures.
Meanwhile, in 1981, the Cabinet Yoshiyuki Suzuki established the Second Extraordinary Administrative Investigation Committee (Second Enlightenment, President Toshio Tsuchoi) as an advisory body and deliberated deliberations on fiscal reconstruction including the reform of the National Railways I did. Furthermore, on February 5, 1982, the LDP launched the “JNR reconstruction subcommittee” (President Hiroshi Mitsuka).
In the second impression, substantive deliberations on the reform of the national railroads were held at the fourth subcommittee (President Hiroyasu Kato). In addition to deliberating, President Kato announced “Joint Railway Dismantling” (“Modern” 1982 April issue), Yajiyama Tarou participated in the “JNR labor-management theory” (“Bungei Spring autumn” April 1982 issue) We actively disseminated information on the premise of split privatization.
On July 30, 1982 (July 30), the second impression was based on the basic report that “the national railway should be divided privatized within 5 years” and officially announced, it has greatly steered to the extinction of the national rail itself. Suzuki cabinet decided on Cabinet meeting on September 24 to proceed with divisional privatization according to the report.
Even within the Liberal Democratic Party, there were not a few opponents opposed to divisional privatization, such as transport families Kato June and Tamuramoto, but the Nakasone cabinet, which was established on 27 November the same year, will actively promote divisional privatization Become. On November 30, the establishment of the JNR reconstruction supervision committee was decided, and on 13 th May 1983 law to establish the supervision committee was established at the House of Councilors and officially launched on June 10 (Mr. Masao Kamei) . Mr. Masashi Matsuda, Noriyuki Kasai, Masataka Ide and others promoted split privatization in the inside of the National Railways, and Matsuda and others were called “the national railway reform triad”. Meanwhile, the railway management team who opposed the division privatization was called “national protectionist”.
However, Nakasone was still cautious. Tanaka Kakuei, which was effectively a King maker of the LDP, accepted privatization, but opposed the division. The national railway management team and national labor depended on Tanaka, trying to drop the non-split privatization. That was the content of “Basic policy for management reform” submitted by the JNR to the JNR reconstruction supervision committee on January 10, 1985 (1985). However, contents were leaked to the divisional privatization school beforehand, and the media received severe criticism from the media. On the management side, ordered Akiyama Kanbun Material Director-General to direct secret data that insisted on non-split privatization, and distributed it to Diet members, media and others. In addition, I reformed the “reformist” Ide on September 21, 1984 to the Tokyo West Railway Administration Bureau and Matsuda to Hokkaido on March 15, 1985, trying to suppress the divisional privatization faction.
On February 6, Prime Minister Nakasone responded to the question of Mr. Saburo Tsukamoto (Democratic Party of Japan) on the national iron plan as “Mother’s Day Hinomaru” and stated that he should “have a match”. The power of Tanaka Kakuei was upset by the construction of Noboru Takeshita (Founder Committee), and herself fell into cerebral infarction on February 27 also enforced the theory of division privatization. In the second Nakasone remodeled cabinet, which was established in December 1985, we have Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, the chairperson of the Liberal Democratic Party Railway Rebuilding Subcommittee mentioned above, as the Minister of Transportation (retired as a result of the 1986 election day). On May 27, 1986, Nippon Steel’s managing director Tomoyuki Ota wrote to the Asahi newspaper reporter that he was “off the record,” accusing Masao Kamei and “The National Railway Reform Team”, he said that they are rooted in non-split privatization It was. This remark leaked to Kasai, further reported to Nakasone through Taro Yamaji. Nakasone told this, after presiding Iwao Nishisugi, submitted eight national railroad leaders opposing the split privatization. On June 21, Omura let him resign himself spontaneously and set up Sagiura Takaya as president of successor National Railways. Those who were released in “The National Railway Reform Three People” and others were recalled to the headquarters, the railway management team won the division privatization promotion school victory.
Since the interest on the debts accumulated so far has fallen into a vicious circle of increasing debt by snowballing further, in response to the Ministry of Transport’s estimate of 1983 on August 2, 1982, in return for compensating for debt It was confirmed that new employment hiring of the staff was suspended. In 1985 (only in 1985), only university graduates were recruited as “executive candidates after privatization”, and the following year again, including graduates, was discontinued.
It was a major purpose of the privatization of the National Railways to handle large amounts of cumulative debt by burdens of JR companies that privatized and improved management, selling of JNR assets, and taxes from the Japanese Government. However, Nakasone says that the true purpose of the privatization of the National Railway Split was subsequently dismantled in the labor union.
The cumulative debt of JNR reached 37 trillion yen. The argument that it is a deliberate false alarm is also made from the labor union side that opposed privatization of division, but even when only interest payment exceeds 1 trillion yen a year, in fact the time when the land price suddenly rises with the bubble economy , It was not the amount that can solve the debt at all even if the holding assets were sold.
Regeneration of railroad by community-based management
The shipping share of the JNR accounted for about 50% in 1960, but due to mismatches with regional needs by uniform transport throughout the country for many years, delay in technological innovation, and private cars due to successive price increases and road network improvement , The development of aviation and express buses, etc., in 1985 it fell to less than half, about 23%.
Redundant staff rearrangement
As a result of hiring a large number of war repatriates in national policy, the high staffing rate became a problem, the national railway reconstruction supervision committee said that the new company had to have 183 thousand people. As of April 1986, the number of JNR officials was approximately 276,000, and 93,000 people were expected to be “surplus personnel.”
Approximately 70,000 of them responded to voluntary retirement. For retiring volunteers, re-employment has been paid to civil servants, special corporations, private enterprises, other railway companies, etc. and reemployed. As a result, about 206,000 people were adopted at the time of privatization. We rejected the new company and there were about 7,000 people sent to the JNR Clearing Corporation. Those who requested local recruitment in Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Kyushu where surpluses were serious (Local recruitment requests and blank answers were also policies of domestic labor) were found by the JNR management team “Showa Echigo 8 Those who were deemed to have been suspended two or more times during the fiscal year from fiscal year 61 to fiscal year 1, or who have received the disposition at least once for six months or more, and have reasons not to comply with the recruitment standards, etc. Met.
Approximately 1,600 people were employed as civil service carriers, but about 1,100 people were handed over to JR companies.
Demolition of Kokoro
JNR, which held the “National Railway Reform Three People”, gave the labor union a “labor-management joint declaration” to conclude a collective agreement “employment stability agreement” with each union. Furthermore, the national labor who abolished the employment stability agreement continued to withdraw from the partners due to employment concerns. On April 13, 1986, “Shinkansen Trade Union” (Chairman Tetsuro Furukawa) split and opened a formation tournament under the cooperation of labor and ironworkers (Mangokoro was said to be a member of the revolutionary system) .
JNR and JR were separate companies, and JR had no obligation to recruit JNR officials. According to law, the former national railway and the new company are irrelevant, and they were made a person who applied for a new company after leaving the former national railway. .
Of the approximately 7,000 people who refused to adopt JR other than locally, to government agencies, special corporations, private enterprises, 70.8% of the national labor union members. The rest was a member of all mobility, mobility Chiba. Although the Clearing Corporation Dissolved in 1990, there were 1,047 people who continued to refuse to hire Honshu JR and public employees, private companies, and other railway companies. Many of them were national labor union members. National labor, total mobility, movement Mr. Chiba made a petition for relief to the Central Labor Relations Commission, and JR companies filed an objection to the Central Labor Relations Commission with dissatisfaction when an order for relief was approved. Since the Middle Economic Cooperation Committee also issued a relief order, although not all, JR companies appealed to the Chief Justice Committee as “JNR and JR are irrelevant”, and the Supreme Court has decided the winning of the JR side. However, lawsuits continued on the legal responsibility of the former JNR, and in 2010 (2010), based on the Yukio Hatoyama cabinet of the Democratic Party, settlement was achieved by paying 22 million yen per household as a settlement money . Furthermore, after the political resolution, the Ministry of National Treasury execution exiled the members who participated in the lawsuit.
Kogane insisted against the division and privatization opposition to the people due to the decline in service. The government side is “Maintaining a lazy work environment and staff hospitality that can not be done by private enterprises” such as normalization of Yami holidays, Yami breaks, Yami Super allowance, Overtime work of Kara, Alcoholic drinking service, Violation of clothing regulations etc. “The mass media put up a campaign to criticize Japanese labor in succession.
Meanwhile, it was said that it was made as an excuse for justification for “the divisional privatization of national work” to division privatization “which is originally raised this way” split privatization for the resolution of huge debt ” There is also a view to do.
Division method
To divide the national railway of the nationwide unitary organization for each region was to reduce the management scale of one company and to get to community.
Matters considered in the division are as follows.
We do not make trains that pass directly to different companies in one big city as much as possible.
Include trains that carry out city-to-city transport like the express train in the same company as much as possible.
One jurisdiction should be handled by one company as much as possible.
Reduce trains via three or more companies as much as possible.
Passage train · Pass the number of passengers as few as possible as a boundary point.
Meanwhile, what has been considered not to consider is as follows.
Take the vertical separation method.
Divide at the boundary of the existing railroad administration.
Make the Shinkansen a separate company.
Make urban transport only a separate company.
While considering various division points as a plan, the management scale and the number of personnel of the company to be divided were calculated and examined. Especially for Honshu where lines are intertwined and lines of operation are set complicatedly, the number of divisions such as 2 divisions, 3 divisions, 4 divisions, 5 divisions, etc. were also examined, and investigations were made with various division points further changed for each It was. It is difficult to divide the Tokaido Shinkansen with a large number of direct passengers in the middle, the Tohoku Shinkansen and the Joetsu Shinkansen sharing the railway factory and the command center are also difficult to divide In consideration of the plan, it was decided to divide it into two parts in eastern Honshu of Tokyo head office (Koushinetsu east) and Osaka head office west Honshu (Tokai · Hokuriku and west), but the Tokaido Shinkansen of Super Dollar Box Route belongs to Honshu Western Company Because it was judged that the earnings of eastern Honshu companies were lower than the Honshu western company, it was decided that in the area scheduled for the Tokai district including the Tokaido Shinkansen and the eastern Honshu out of the areas planned to be finally Honshu Western Company Among them, the plan to make the southern areas of Yamanashi and Nagano prefectures separate company of Nagoya head office is to be implemented.
In addition, it is possible to change various train crew members that directly connect to different companies, in charge of vehicle maintenance and management, vehicle usage fee calculation, fare calculation and settlement, assignment of vehicle base in charge, division of equipment and sharing of usage expenses For the problem, the establishment of new rules became necessary.
The actual division place between companies was outside of the boundary station site signal (outside the station as seen from the station). This is because the concept of taking charge of all the facilities of one station by one company. For Tokaido main line Komiya station as well, there is a boundary on the Tokaido main line traffic light inside the Tanna tunnel, the inside (Tokyo side) becomes JR East Japan, the outside becomes JR Tokai, but because the tunnel structure can not be divided , The entire tunnel is managed by JR Tokai. In addition, Tokaido main line Yonehara station boundary between the JR Tokai and JR West traffic lights on the descending ground makes it too complicated, so the first downlink traffic light on Tokyo is the boundary. Regarding Kameyama station, it is the jurisdiction station of JR Tokai, but the Kameyama agency district on the west side of the station premises belongs to JR West because it was in charge of Kameyama station Kansai station which is the route of JR West Japan It was. This led to a side effect that the Ise Agency Ward, which was scheduled to be deprecated, will survive in order to maintain the JR Tokai vehicle base in this area.
Passage
The left wing camp is united and opposes. On November 29, 1985, the core faction raised the simultaneous multi-country guerrilla incident and put the national electronics in the capital region and other national paralysis in a day, but not only did the determination of the Nakasone cabinet have not changed, (The Japanese Communist Party, which was opposed to the divisional privatization itself, also criticized the disturbance of travel caused by such terrorist attacks). The Komeito and the DPJ agreed with the LDP bill, the Socialist Party opposed the division (privatization is acceptable), the Japanese Communist Party opposed the division / privatization itself. In the same day election of the election on July 6, 1986, Liberal Democratic Party, who pledged to privatize the three public corporations such as national railroads as a commitment, won the race, and the opposition party including the Socialist Party of Japan wrecked, Privatization was effectively decided.
At the labor union, ironwork, which was formerly a cooperative labor-management cooperation route, quickly allowed privatization, but in other unions the opinion will be broken. Mobility initially opposed privatization, but due to the crack with domestic labor after the strike strike and the fact that divisional privatization was decided on the same day elections, Mr. Akira Matsuzaki’s cooperation ” Under the policy of “to protect employment”, it will turn to favor privatization. Among them, domestic work conflicted with the privatization favor and the opposition factions did not agree.
Kunitomo opened an extraordinary event on October 9, 1986, the non-mainstream school led by Igarashi Chuo executive committee (former socialist group leftist) and the anti-mainstream school led by Tokuzawa Chuo executive committee (Communist party) It was brought into the vote, and the result of the vote occupied the vast majority against split / privatization. As a result, Chairman Yoshinori Shunichi was forced to retire and Toshiro Roppongi was elected from Morioka district headquarters as successor (Shuzenji Games). Yamazaki led the mainstream school splitting and privatization (right wing) withdrew from domestic work and eventually formed the Iron and Steel Industry Association. This Shuzenji Games triggered internal collapse and lost great power. Formation of the Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., is said to have also been encouraged by the Socialist Party as a second best measure to be adopted by JR. Meanwhile, disappointment with the Roppongi regime of full confrontation monopoly and the labor-management relations of the national railroad, successive withdrawal from workplace, from domestic work to private division privatization, including those who retired the national rail itself more than 200,000 unions Although the total number of employees (employees) also decreased greatly due to the withdrawal and rationalization of the members, they fell into a small number of unions. Domestic work was self-destructed as a result of neglecting the living and employment concerns of the end association, which is the origin of labor union, as a result of the idea struggle.
As mentioned above, according to the reconstruction law of the national railroad established in 1980 prior to the discussion on division privatization, the abolition of unprofitable routes with a low transport density was in progress at the time. From 1981, the selection of specific local transportation lines to be abolished for the third round was advanced, and eventually the 83 rd line was selected. There were opposition from the people along the railway line, etc. Starting with the Shijiku line in 1983, 45 routes were abolished (bus conversion), 36 routes were converted into the third sector, two routes were transferred to private railways and survived as railroads. This measure was continued even if the split privatization was officially decided, and in 1990 after privatization, the conversion to the third sector · Miyazu line of North Kinki tango railroads, the blacksmith line, The treatment of the route was settled. Compared with the abolition of the former “deficit 83 lines”, it can be said that the abolition has progressed quite well. Organization of this route started without relation to split privatization, but the privatized company brought about the result of inauguration almost without taking over these unprofitable routes. However, the Ise Line (now Ise railroad) which most honorary train had been passing from that time was converted to the third sector, but despite its lower utilization than these, it has an independent route name There was a section where it was escaped because it was a branch line of no other line section, and there was also a voice saying that selection of abolishment route was “not consistent with the actual situation” from that time. Two routes (Shimokita Transport Ohata Line, Konan Railway Kuroishi Line) transferred to existing private transportation companies were abolished afterwards due to an increase in the deficit, for example. The third sectorization route also took off from the Hokkaido Chihoku Takahara railway which was completely abolished in April 2006, and the Kamioka Railway, Miki Railway and Takachiho Railway abolished the whole line due to the increase in deficit accompanying the decrease of users and the disaster caused by natural disasters, And the train is abolishing most of the route. The surplus is recorded only in a small part such as the Aichi annual railroad which is close to the metropolitan area and the conditions are endowed, and the transformation subsidy provided to each company also declines greatly owing to the decrease in investment profit due to the decline in interest rates are doing.
In November 1986, the eight national railway reform-related laws (the National State Railway Reform Act, the Law on Passenger Railroad Co., Ltd. and Nippon Cargo Railroad Co., Ltd., the Shinkansen Railway Ownership Organization Act, the Japan National Owned Railway Company Law Act, the Japan National Official Railway Retirement One of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Reemployment of Desired Staff and Nippon Oil Railway Company League Staff Employees, Railway Business Act, Enforcement Act of Japan National Railway Reform Act, etc, Local Tax Law and Locations Municipal Grants and Payments The law to amend the Department) was established, and legal preparation for privatization was completed.
Besides this, in Hokkaido and Kyushu where there are many surplus staffs due to the abolition of the deficit routes mentioned above, and the opportunities for employment are poor due to the decline of the regional economy, in order to optimize the staffing placement, we will allocate surplus staff to the Honshu metropolitan area Wide regional transfers to be transferred to train district, station, factory, etc. in Tohoku, China and Shikoku were conducted from May to December 1986, and furthermore wide area adoption by Honshu 3 companies before and after the start of the new company I was wrong. Particularly in the case of Hokkaido, more than 6000 people including their families have been transferred to maintain employment as railway employees. Also, a large number of surplus personnel have been accepted by private railroads, private buses, private enterprises, etc. who were short of manpower at the time.